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I. INTRODUCTION

As never before, current socio-political, economic, and
technological changes are having an impact on domestic and
international attitudes toward business corruption.
This has
precipitated a recent dramatic increase in anti-corruption
activities within the United States and by international
government and non-governmental organizations.
A relevant
question to consider is what factors have caused the current
change in attitude. An answer to this question is found through

an evaluation of a multiplicity of significant changes in the
environmental framework for international business.
As the first antibribery legislation of its kind worldwide, it is
necessary to start the examination of environmental changes with
the 1977 Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA or the Act),' which,
in response to criticisms from the U.S. business community, 2 was
amended in 1988. 3 Few legal actions were ever brought under
the provisions of the 1977 FCPA by either the Department of
Justice (DOJ) or the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC)
from the initial passage of the Act to the time of its 1988
amendments. 4 Until recently no other country was willing to
consider following the lead of the United States in adopting
prohibitions against bribery. In fact, some countries continued

1.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat.
1494 (codified as 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff) (amending
scattered sections of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-78kk

(1976)).
2.
See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, IMPACT OF FOREIGN
CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS: COMPTROLLER GENERAL'S REPORT TO THE

CONGRESS 6 (Mar. 4, 1981) (noting that many corporate officials believe the costs
of complying exceed the benefits, and that complying caused U.S. firms to lose
business) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
3.
The FCPA was amended in 1988 by the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat. 1107, 1415-25 (1988)
[hereinafter Trade Act].
4.
See Dominic Bencivenga, Anti-bribery Campaign: SEC Cracks Down on

llegal PaymentsAbroad, N.Y.L.J., Apr. 10, 1997, at 5-6.
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their practice of allowing the tax deductibility of bribery
payfrients. 5
Only since 1989 has the interplay of various dynamics led to
a more negative global perspective regarding corrupt business
practices and a marked increase in anti-corruption activity
domestically and by international governmental and nongovernmental organizations. Such dynamics include: the model
provided by the FCPA since its adoption in 1977 and the more
aggressive enforcement of it in the last decade; the transition of
many former socialist countries to market economies at the end of
the Cold War; the increased integration of Europe; the
proliferation of international mergers; the advent of a borderless
global market enhanced by technological advances; and a
developing worldwide awareness of the economic costs of
6
corruption.

This Article will 1) briefly discuss domestic U.S. anticorruption efforts through a review of the substantive content of
the 1977 FCPA and its 1988 amendments; 2) evaluate indicators

of changes in domestic attitudes and policies toward business
corruption as evidenced by the breadth and scope of recent
increased enforcement activities of DOJ and the SEC; 3) analyze
the factors causing recent changes in international attitudes and
policies toward business corruption; and 4) examine the resulting
international efforts to combat business corruption by
governmental and non-governmental organizations, financial
standard setting organizations, and financial institutions.

II. DOMESTIc EFFORTS TO ERADICATE BRIBERY

A. DomesticLegislative History
It is important to examine the legislative history of the FCPA
in order to fully understand the current domestic efforts-since
the 1988 amendments-to eradicate bribery, as well as to analyze
the statute's impact on international anti-corruption efforts.

5.
See OECD Initiatives to Fight Corruption, Note by Secretary General to
the OECD Council at Ministerial Level (May 1997).
6.
See Peter Eigen, Combating Corruption Around the World, J. OF
DEMOCRACY, VII(l), Jan. 1996, 158-68; Steven R. Salbu, Bribery in the Global
Market: A CriticalAnalysis of the Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 54 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 229 (1997); Evelyn Iritani & Stuart Silverstein, The World Makes Business Go
Round, L.A. TIMES, May 10, 1998, at Al, A15; Josef Joffe, The Euro: A Huge,
Dangerous Gamblefor Europe, INT'L HERALD TRIB., May 20, 1998, at 7; Lucinda A.
Low & Kathryn Cameron Atdnson, Led by the U.S., The World Wages War on
Corruption,NATL L. J,, Mar. 3, 1997, at B9.
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U.S. attention first focused on business corruption with the
discovery of massive bribery by the U.S. business community
during the "Watergate" scandal in the early 1970s. During the
investigation of illegal campaign contributions made to Richard
Nixon's campaign for a second presidential term, it was
discovered that at least twenty-five of America's largest companies
were making illegal contributions, including American Airlines,
Ashland Oil, Exxon, General Motors, Gulf Oil, International
7
Telephone and Telegraph, Lockheed Aircraft, and United Brands.
In addition to the discovery of illegal campaign contributions,
the U.S. government discovered that the practice of offering
kickbacks and making cash gifts in exchange for business was
simply part of the modus operandi. 9 When the Watergate scandal
occurred, the United States had no laws prohibiting multinational companies from bribing foreign officials to obtain
favorable consideration on contracts and other business

transactions.
It is clear that after Watergate the American public needed
some demonstration by Congress and other political leaders that
they recognized that changes in government attitudes towards
ethics and morality were imperative. The United States directed
its efforts to eliminate corrupt business practices towards the
adoption of a statutory prohibition against corporate bribery of
foreign government officials for the purpose of obtaining or
retaining business.' 0
In 1977, the Congress took strong
legislative action by passing the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act
(FCPA), which includes antibribery provisions and accounting
provisions. 11 This statute was the first legislation worldwide to
target the problem of business corruption by criminalizing the
giving of bribes by business entities, in contrast to the approach
12
of criminalizing the taking of bribes by government officials.

7.
See GEORGE C. GREANIAS & DUANE WINDSOR, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES AT: ANATOMY OFA STATUTE 17-19, 22 (1982).
8.
See generally REPORT OF THE SEC. AND EXCH. COMM'N SUBMITTED TO THE
SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, Hous., AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS.,
QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES 54-55 (Comm. Print

1976) (finding that the problem

of questionable

and illegal payments is

widespread, rather than an abberation limited to a few individuals).
9.

See CHRISTOPHER ENGHOLM, WHEN BUSINESS EAST MEETS BUSINESS WEST

238 (1991) (describing pervasive system of kickbacks in Asian countries).
10.
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (1997) (dealing with "issuers" and

"domestic concerns" respectively).
11.

See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, supranote 1.

12.

See i.

6

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL. 32:1

1. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 1977
The Act is divided into two sections:
the first section
specifically prohibits bribery of foreign officials,13 and the second
section includes accounting provisions intended to deter and
detect such illicit payments. 14 The latter accounting provisions
regulate corporate financial record keeping and internal control
15
systems.
To facilitate an understanding of the FCPA and its impact on
governmental ability to curb business corruption, the substantive
content of the statute and its amendments are reviewed briefly in
the following sections.

a. Antibribery Sections
The antibribery provisions include: 1) A prohibition against
the direct and indirect bribery of foreign officials by issuers and
reporting firms under the jurisdiction of the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC),16 and 2) a prohibition of direct and
indirect bribery of foreign officials by domestic concerns,
including any U.S. citizen, national, or resident, and any business
entity organized under U.S. law. 17
Through the use of the term "domestic concerns" both SEC
registrants and non-registrants are covered by the Act. s
Prosecutors were given an advantage in carrying the burden of
proof against a defendant for the intent element that is required
for prohibited acts under the FCPA. The Act prohibited bribes to
"any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a
portion of such money or thing of value will be offered, given or
promised, directly or indirectly, to any foreign official, to any
foreign political party or official thereof, or to any candidate for
foreign political office." 19
"Facilitating" or so-called "grease"
21
20
payments made to "foreign officials" were exempt.

13.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2.

14.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1997).

15.
16.
17.

See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1997).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a), (h)(1997).

18.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(h)(1) (1997).
See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, supra note 1 (emphasis

19.
added).

20.
A "foreign official" was defined by the Act as "any officer or employee of
a foreign government or any department, agency or instrumentality thereof, or
any person acting in an official capacity for or on behalf of any such government
or department, agency of instrumentality." 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(1). The term did

not include employees of a foreign government whose duties are essentially

ministerial or clerical.
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b. Accounting Sections

The accounting provisions of the FCPA were passed as part of
a series of amendments to the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(1934 Act).2 2 Unlike the antibribery sections of the Act, the
accounting provisions in section 102 of the FCPA apply only to
"issuers" registered under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.23

Therefore, Section 102 applies to all corporations covered by the
1934 Act, and thus covers companies that are engaged solely in
domestic businesses, as well as those engaged in international
business. As a result, an American company does not have to be
24
either foreign or corrupt to come within the FCPA's jurisdiction.
The accounting provisions of the Act represent an attempt by
Congress to address the overall problem of corporate concealment
of illicit payments; such payments are often disguised through the
use of improper accounting procedures by companies subject to
SEC jurisdiction. The accounting provisions follow through with
the ideas that first appeared in the SEC Report submitted to
Congress in 1976 prior to the adoption of the FCPA. The Report
noted that although deterrence of corporate bribery is an
important goal, the most important goal of the FCPA is to
establish a system of controls that will ensure general corporate
25
accountability.
The accounting provisions of the Act are (1) section
13(b)(2)(A), which establishes record-keeping requirements by
mandating that all corporations "make and keep books, records,
and accounts, which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly
reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the
issuer,"2 6 and (2) section 13(b)(2)(B), which requires corporations
to "devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls
sufficient to provide reasonable assurances"
that transactions and
27
assets are properly maintained.

The accounting provisions of the FCPA were considered by
some to be the broadest application of federal law to corporate
28
management and accountability since the 1934 Act.

21.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(2) (1977). Congress intended this exemption

to cover nominal payments used to expedite a business transaction that were
made to persons whose duties did not include policy-making functions.
22.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1997).

23.

See id.

See LAMBERT H. SPRONK, THE FINANCIAL EXECUTIVE's HANDBOOK FOR
MANAGING MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 264 (1980).
24.

25.
See GAO REPORT, supranote 2, at 70, 71.
26.
15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2)(A) (1997).
27.
Id. at § 78m(b)(2)(B).
28.
In the 1934 Act, the main objective of Congress was to prohibit
misrepresentations and other wrongful conduct by requiring every issuer of

8
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2. Passage of Amendments to the FCPA in the Omnibus Trade
and Competitiveness Act, 1988

a. Amendments to the Antibribery Provisions
(1) Change in the "Scienter" Requirement

The language of the original FCPA created uncertainty
because the requisite mens rea for a violation was established
when the defendant knew or had reason to know that a corrupt
act had taken place. As a result, Congress eliminated the phrase
"having reason to know," in the 1988 amendments, 2 9 leaving a
"knowing"30 standard that incorporates only prohibited acts that
involve "actual knowledge" of intended results.3 1 The requisite
"state of mind" for these categories of offenses is satisfied when
there is a "conscious purpose to avoid learning the truth."3 2 The
effect of the amended Act is to remove the possibility that there
might be a prosecution based on more ambiguous situations.
(2) Clarification of "Facilitating Payments"
As previously discussed, an exception existed under the
original Act for "facilitating payments" made to foreign officials
whose duties were "essentially ministerial or clerical."33 This
distinction was not easily made in countries where difficulties
3 4
were encountered with language and cultural differences.

securities to file periodic reports disclosing financial information in order to
facilitate informed decisions by investors. The prevailing principle underlying
both the 1933 and 1934 Securities Acts was the emphasis on open, fair, and
orderly markets.
29.
The changes met with strong opposition from Senator Proxmire (D-

Wis.), who was one of the authors of the original Act.
30.
A separate provision in the Act defines "knowledge." The "knowledge"
requirement is an awareness of a high probability of the existence of the

circumstance. H.R. REP. No. 100-576, at 920, reprinted in 1988 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1952, 1953 [hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
The new definitions set forth in the amendments are derived from the Model
Penal Code and have been interpreted in the courts under several criminal
statutes. See John E. Inpert, A Programfor Compliance with the Foreign Corrupt
PracticesAct andForeign Law Restrictionson the Use of Sales Agents, 24 INTL LAW.,

Winter 1990, at 1009.
31.
See CONFERENcE REPORT, supra note 30. This Conference Report was
adopted by the conferees as the legislative history of the Amendments. However,
in the Conference Report, Congress discussed that this standard encompasses
the concepts of willful blindness and conscious disregard or deliberate ignorance
of known circumstances that should reasonably alert one to the high probability
of violations of the Act. See id. at 919-21.
32.
See id. at 919.
33.
34.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(2) (1977).
See Impert, supranote 30, at 1015.
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In the amended Act, Congress sought to set forth exactly
what constituted exempt acts under this provision.
The
Conference Report explained that it applied to payments for
"routine governmental action," defined as "ordinarily and
commonly performed" actions which do not include governmental
approvals involving an exercise of discretion by a governmental
official where the actions are the functional equivalent of
"obtaining or retaining business for or with, or directing business
35
to, any person."
(3) Addition of Affirmative Defenses
Congress considered several other exceptions, but in the end
chose to categorize them as the following affirmative defenses: 1)

Lawful under the written laws and regulations of the foreign
37
official's country,3 6 2) Reasonable and bona fide expenditures.

(4)Penalties 3 8
As a balance to the more liberal provisions of the amended
Act, Congress drastically increased the penalties for violations of
the bribery section of the amended Act. As an example, the civil
liability was increased from a maximum of five thousand dollars
to a maximum of ten thousand dollars.3 9 As provided in the
original Act, corporations are precluded from indemnifying their
employees against liability. 4°
b. Accounting Provisions
(1) Deletion of the "Reason To Know" Standard
The 1988 amendments also deleted the "reason to know"
language from the accounting provisions. 41 The amended
provision provides that there will be no liability for violation of the
accounting provisions unless a corporation "shall knowingly
circumvent or knowingly fail to implement a system of internal

35.

CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 30, at 921.

36.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-i(c)(1) (1988).

37.
"If a payment or gift is corruptly made in return for an official act or
omission, then it cannot be a bona fide, good-faith payment." CONFERENCE
REPORT, supranote 30, at 922.

38.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g) (1998).

39
40.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(1)(B), 78dd-2(g)(1)(B).
See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78ff(c)(3), 78dd-2(g)(3).

41.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(5) (1997).
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accounting controls or knowingly falsify any book, record, or
account." 42
(2) The "Good Faith Effort" Requirement for U.S. Companies with
a Minority Interest in a Foreign Subsidiary
A vital addition to the FCPA is the 1988 amendment that
clarifies a corporation's responsibility for the financial record
keeping and internal accounting controls of its subsidiaries. The
amendment applies to all issuers of SEC registered securities with
respect to the accounting practices of either a foreign or domestic
subsidiary.4
This particular provision distinguishes corporate
FCPA responsibility of a parent company for its subsidiaries based
on the percentage of ownership in the subsidiary.44
(3) Clarification of the "Reasonable Detail" and "Reasonable
Assurance" Standards on Record Keeping and Internal Control
Compliance
The 1988 amendment attempted to clarify the meaning of the
Act's requirements that financial records be kept in reasonable
detail and that internal controls be maintained to provide
reasonable assurances as to accountability for assets so that
compliance could be more easily achieved.
The clarification consisted of defining the terms "reasonable
detail" and "reasonable assurances" to mean that level of detail
and level of assurance that "would satisfy prudent officials in the
45
conduct of their own affairs."

42.
Id. The Conference Report states that this provision was intended "to
ensure that criminal penalties would be imposed where acts of commission or
omission in keeping books or records or administering accounting controls" have
occurred. CONFERENCE REPORT, supranote 30, at 916 (emphasis added). Deletion
of the "reason to know" standard simply codified an SEC enforcement policy
which had been implemented under the provisions of the 1977 Act. To give
greater assurance to the business community that the SEC would only pursue
serious misconduct, the Enforcement Policy provided that "inadvertent
recordkeeping mistakes" and falsifications of which management "was not aware
and reasonably should not have known" will not result in SEC enforcement
proceedings. Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Exchange Act Release No.
17,500, 46 Fed. Reg. 11,544, 1981 SEC LEXIS 2167, at *5 (Jan. 29, 1981)
[hereinafter Enforcement Policy].

43.
44.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(6) (1997).
If a corporation "holds 50 per centum or less of the voting power with

respect to a domestic or foreign firm," the corporation is only required to "proceed

in good faith to use its influence, to the extent reasonable under the issuer's

circumstances," to cause the subsidiary to comply with the record keeping and
internal control requirements of the Act. Id. (emphasis added). A corporation
covered by the statute that owns more than fifty percent of the subsidiary would
have to require that the subsidiary comply fully with the original 1977 financial
reporting and internal control provisions.
45.
15 U.S.C. § 78m (b)(7).

GLOBAL ANTIBPIBERY LEGISLATION
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3. Passage of Amendments to the FCPA in the International
Antibribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998
The 1998 Trade Act expressed the sense of Congress that the
U.S. President should pursue the negotiation of an international
agreement among the members of the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) in an attempt to promote
President
international cooperation in preventing bribery.4 '
Clinton delegated his functions under the Trade Act to the
Secretary of State. Ultimately, the United States was successful
in providing some impetus to the efforts of the OECD to obtain a
multilateral antibribery agreement which resulted in the 1997
OECD Convention on Combatting Bribery of Foreign Public
Officials in International Business Transactions (discussed in a
later section).4 7 The Convention was signed by twenty-nine
OECD Members on December 17, 1997 and became effective
February 15, 1999.4 8
In October 1998, the U.S. Congress further amended the
FCPA to conform to the OECD Convention in a statute known as
the International Antibribery and Fair Competition Act of 1998
(International Antibribery Act). The relevant sections that were
changed in the 1998 amendments are as follows:
a. Expanded Definition of Bribery'
In order to clarify the meaning of bribery, the amendment
states that bribery covers illicit payments to obtain business
contracts and adds a prohibition on payments to secure "any
improper advantage. "4 9
b. Expanded Definition of 'Foreign Public Official'
The definition of 'oreign public official' has been amended to

include officials of "public international organizations. "50 Among
others,

46.
47.

this

definition

is

intended

to

include

officials

of

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1988).
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD),

CONVENTION ON COMBAITING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN INTERNATIONAL

BusINEss TRANSACnONS, Dec. 17, 1997, OECD/IME/BR(97) 16 FINAL (visited Sept 14,
[hereinafter OECD
1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bnber/20nov23.htm>
Convention).

See STUART DEMING, FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES, 32 INT'L LAWYER (2) 463

(1988). See supra Part V.B.1.
OECD Convention <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bribery/htm>.
48.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(2)(iii) (1998); 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a)(3)(ii) (1998).
49.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(1)(1) (1998).
50.

12
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organizations such as the World Bank and the International
Monetary Fund. s l
c. Added Alternative Jurisdiction Provision
The alternative jurisdiction provision eliminates any U.S.
territorial nexus requirement for FCPA applicability to U.S.
domestic concerns and issuers. The language of the amendment
now prohibits corrupt acts based on nationals being held
responsible on a worldwide basis (the nationality principle)
"irrespective of whether such issuer or such officer, director,
employee, agent, or stockholder makes use of the mails or any
means or instrumentality of interstate commerce in furtherance of
such offer, gift, payment, promise, or authorization."5 2
d. Added 'United States person' Provision (in implementation of
the OECD Convention)
The OECD Convention1
prohibited payments by "any
person" acting in whole or part within the state's territory, not
just issuers and domestic concerns like the 1988 FCPA.-4

e. Added Penalties for those Prohibited Foreign Trade Practices by
Persons Other Than Issuers or Domestic Concerns
The 1998 amendments added a category (discussed in "d"
55
above) of persons "other than issuers or domestic concerns."
When these persons engage in prohibited foreign trade practices,
the penalties imposed on them are the same as the penalties
imposed on issuers and domestic concerns.
B. Indicatorsof Change in DomesticAttitudes and
Policies TowardBusiness Corruption
In the years subsequent to the 1988 amendments there has
been an increase in the actual number of cases filed by the SEC
and a widening of the scope of jurisdiction under the FCPA
asserted by the SEC.5 6 In the pursuit of alleged offenders, DOJ

51.

Lucinda Low & Michael Burton, Corruption is Target of Multilateral

Efforts, NAT. L.J., May 4, 1998, at C5.
52.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(c)(1)(g) (1998).
53.
54.

Low & Burton, supranote 51.
See supranote 49.

55.

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(e).

56.

See Carolyn Hotchkiss, The Sleeping Dog Stirs: New Signs of Life in

Efforts to End Corruption in International Business, 17(1) J. OF PUB. POLY &
MARKETING 108 (1998).
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and the SEC have had the advantage of being able to threaten
harsher penalties legislated in the 1988 amendments. 57
Additionally, more recent events and factors may indicate a
continued increase in enforcement of the FCPA.5 8 Commentators
have linked this increase to the greater attention being given to
60
white collar crime, 59 to the rapid growth of global competition,
and to the policy changes within the current presidential
61
administration and U.S. government.
The SEC recently reinforced the message that it is seriously
prosecuting FCPA violations when Paul Gerlach, the Associate
Director of Enforcement for the SEC, noted that "[w]hile we have
not brought a lot of cases in the recent past, there will be more in
"62
the future.

The SEC has markedly increased the prosecution of
violations of the accounting provisions in recent years.
Significant cases that involve accounting provision violations, SEC
v. Montedison (November 1996),63 In the Matter of David Gore
(February 1997),6 and SEC v. Triton Energy Corporation(February
1997),65 are reviewed in the next sections. The reasons for
choosing the accounting provisions as the bases for civil
enforcement were expressed by Gregory J. Wallance, a partner at
Kaye, Scholer, Fierman, Hays & Handler:
There's a tendency to think of the FCPA as a criminal enforcement
tool and to overlook the fact that the SEC can bring a[n]
[accounting provision] charge ....
There's a much lower burden of
proof in doing so, and it gives the agency more flexibility. They
don't have to prove bribery directly and don't have to prove the
66
charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

There has also been aggressive activity in investigating and
prosecuting violations of the antibribery provisions. Recently,
Lockheed found itself in difficulties with the U.S. government for
violations of the FCPA, 6 7 resulting in the largest fine in FCPA

57.

The Department of Justice prosecutes criminal violations of the FCPA.

58.
59.

See Hotchkiss, supranote 56.
See James K. Lehman, Foreign CorruptPracticesAct 7 S.C. LAW., Mar.-

Apr. 1996, at 38, 39.
60.

See Gabriel Escobar, IBM is in Trouble in Argentina Indictment Says

Fraud Won Major Contract INTL HERALD TRIB., Apr. 4, 1996.
61.
62.
63.
15,164.

64.

See id.
Bencivenga, supranote 4, at 5.
C.A. No. 1:96CV02631 (D.D.C. 1996); Exchange Act Release No.

Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-9262 (Feb. 27, 1997); Exchange Act

Release No. 38,343.
65.
C.A. No. 1: 97CV00401 (D.D.C. 1997); Litigation Release No. 15,396.
66.
Bencivenga, supranote 4, at 5.

67.
See United States v. Lockheed, 1-CR-226-01 (N.D. Ga. plea agreement
filed Jan. 30, 1995).
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69
history" and the first prison term for a company official.
Lockheed was fined $28.4 million for violating the statute by
paying an Egyptian official and her husband illegal commissions
in order to obtain a contract with Egypt for the sale of C-130
planes. 70
According to the Criminal Division of the U.S.
Attorney's Office, the fine was based on twice the profit Lockheed
received on the sale. 7 1 In addition, two high-level Lockheed
officials in the Middle East sales group were indicted, with both
eventually pleading guilty.7 2
s

1. Widening Scope of SEC Jurisdiction Over Foreign Companies in
FCPA Violations
SEC v. Montedison7 3 is a very significant case that
demonstrates the widening scope of SEC jurisdiction over FCPA
violations. The SEC asserted jurisdiction over Montedison, a
foreign company headquartered in Italy, in regard to bribes paid
abroad. 7 4 The SEC claimed jurisdiction
on the basis that
Montedison traded its securities (ADR's) on the U.S. stock
exchange. 75 This represents a clear shift in SEC policy from its
76
former focus on domestic companies.
The potential jurisdictional implications of the Montedison
case are immense when you consider the dramatic increase since
1993 of cross-border capital flows in which the securities of
foreign companies are traded on other countries' securities
exchanges.
If the SEC's claim of jurisdiction over foreign companies is
successful, it will vastly expand the range of SEC authority. It is
highly probable that the SEC will continue to assert jurisdiction
over the approximately one thousand foreign companies that
currently trade securities on U.S. exchanges, and the SEC will
as the
have increasing opportunity to claim such jurisdiction
77
number of such companies continues to expand.

68.

See id.

69.

See U.S. v. Nassar, 1:94-CR-226-MHS (N.D. Ga. plea entered July 31,

1995); see Low& Atkdnson, supranote 6, at B9, B14.
70.
See id.
71.

72.
73.
15,164.
74.
75.

See id.

See id.
C.A. No. 1:96CV02631 (D.D.C. 1996); Exchange Act Release No.
See id.
See id.

76.
See Bencivenga, supranote 4, at 5.
77.
See DMSION OF CORP. FIN., SEC, CURRENT IssuEs AND RULEMAKING
PROJECTS (1997).
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A critical component of SEC success in filings against foreign
companies, such as Montedison, is the SEC's ability to subpoena
documents and secure employee testimony outside the United
States and territory within the jurisdiction of the U.S. courts. The
SEC has been successful in recent years in negotiating
cooperation agreements, or memorandums of understanding, with
approximately thirty foreign governments in order to establish
official channels of cooperation to facilitate obtaining documents
from foreign companies. 78
The SEC believes that these
memorandums of understanding will result in cooperation from
foreign regulators and law enforcement when the SEC issues
subpoenas related to ongoing investigations of foreign
corporations related to various securities law violations, including
the FCPA. Paul Gerlach, the Associate Director of Enforcement
for the SEC, notes that "[tihere is no question that it's harder to
investigate and will take longer. But, it's not impossible. It can
79
be done."
It is obviously imperative, based on the Montedison case, that
top management, accountants, and attorneys of foreign
companies that are currently trading securities on U.S. exchanges
or that are anticipating doing so must immediately establish
FCPA compliance procedures. These procedures, as with all other
corporate financial reporting to the SEC, should be based on the

United States Generally Accepted Accounting Principles."0

2. Increased Prosecution of Top Executives Directly and Indirectly
Involved in FCPA Violations
The related cases of In the Matter of David Gore8 l and SEC v.
Triton Energy Corp.8 2 illustrate the serious ramifications that can
exist for top levels of management that have access to information
regarding possible FCPA violations committed by their employees
and fail to investigate and/or rectify the potential violation.
The cases concerned a number of alleged violations of both
the FCPA bribery and accounting provisions by Triton Energy
Corporation in Indonesia, its officers and its employees. 8 3 In each
instance an improper payment was made to secure concessions
from various government agencies in Indonesia, and false

78.
79.

See Bencivenga, supranote 4, at 6.
Id.

80.
SEC Accounting Guide, Codification of Financial Reporting Policies,
Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec. 20, 1973).
81.
Admin. Proceeding File No. 3-9262 (Feb. 27, 1997); Exchange Act
Release No. 38,343.
82.
C.A. No. 1: 97CV00401, (D.D.C. 1997) Litigation Release No. 15,396.
83.
SeeAdmin. Proceeding File No. 3-9262; C.A. No. 1:97CV000401.
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documentation was prepared to shield the nature of the payment.
The SEC found that defendants Triton and Murphy violated
Section 13(b)(2)(A) by creating and recording false entries in
84
Triton's books.
Interestingly, senior management Gore and Puetz were also
found in violation of the same section of the FCPA for receiving
information that Triton was engaged in potentially unlawful
conduct and for taking no action to investigate or halt such
conduct. Evidence existed of an internal auditor's memorandum
advising management of the illegal payment.8 5
3. Harsher Penalties Available to DOJ and the SEC under the
1988 Trade Act and the 1998 International Antibribery Act
As an indicator of change in domestic attitudes towards
business corruption harsher penalties are available to DOJ and
the SEC under the 1988 Trade Act and the 1998 International
Antibribery Act. The FCPA divides enforcement authority between
DOJ and the SEC.
The SEC has the authority for the
investigation and civil prosecution of both the accounting and the
antibribery provisions of the FCPA with regard to issuers.8 6 The
DOJ is the agency responsible for criminal enforcement of the
antibribery provisions8 7 (often based on evidence gathered by an
SEC investigation) and for civil enforcement against domestic
concerns.88
Penalties have been added to the 1998 International

Antibribery Act to include the category of persons other than

issuers or domestic concerns that engage in prohibited foreign
trade practices.8 9 These penalties, both criminal and civil, are the
same as the penalties for issuers and domestic concerns that
engage in prohibited conduct under the 1988 amendments. 90
The first relevant penalty states that the criminal fine for
individuals who are directors, officers, stockholders, employees, or
agents who willfully violate the Act may be criminally fined not
more than one hundred thousand dollars, an increase from the
1977 Act which authorized a fine of not more than ten thousand
dollars. 9 1 Second, a person who willfully violates a provision of the

84.

Id.

85.

See id.

86.
87.

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(d), 78dd-1, 78ff(c) (1997).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1 (1997).

88.
89.
90.
domestic

See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-2(d) (1997).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d).
15 U.S.C. § 78dd(2)(g) (1988). Note that the penalties for issuers and
concerns remain the same in the 1998 International Antibribery Act as
they were in the 1988 Trade Act.
91.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g(2)(A) (1997).
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Act may be imprisoned for not more than five years. 92 A convicted
93
person could possibly face both civil penalties and imprisonment.
Third, corporations convicted of willful violations are subject to a
fine not to exceed $2 million, an increase from the original figure of
$1 million in the 1977 Act. 94 Also, civil liability was increased from
a maximum of five thousand dollars to a maximum of ten thousand
dollars. 9 5 Fines imposed on corporate officers and directors may
not be paid directly or indirectly by their companies. 9 6 The impact
of this restriction is that companies can not indemnify their officers

for this type of liability.
In addition, the SEC has the various traditional enforcement
tools available for its use when violations of the 1934 Act occur.
Examples include
the commencement
of administrative
enforcement actions, the right to conduct investigations 9 7 (the
results of which are sometimes used by DOJ), and the power to
subpoena witnesses and require the production of any books,
98
papers, correspondence, memoranda, and records.

III.

FACTORS CAUSING CHANGES IN INTERNATIONAL ATTITUDES AND

POLICIES TOWARD BUSINESS CORRUPTION
The FCPA, among other factors, has played a major role in
changing international attitudes and policies towards business
corruption by heightening awareness of the devastating social,
economic, and political effects of business corruption. Its twentyyear history of successes and failures has helped to shape current
global attitudes towards business corruption.
Another factor causing a shift in attitudes towards business
corruption is an international awareness, brought about by the
globalization of business and security transactions, that the
economic costs of corruption are too high.9 9 A further important
factor influencing international attitudes is the transition of
former Communist nations to free-market economies since the
end of the Cold War- such nations must now compete for capital
from international financial institutions who do not wish to
°°
support or participate in corrupt projects.1

92.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(2)(A), (B) (1997).

93.
94.

95.

See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2g)(1)(A) (1997).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(B), 78dd-2(g)(1)(B) (1988).

96.

See 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(g)(3) (1997).

97.

98.

See 15U.S.C. § 78u(a) (1997).
See 15 U.S.C. § 78u(b) (1997).

99.

See GEORGE MOODY-STUART, GRAND CORRUPTION: How BUSINESS BRIBES

DAMAGE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 41 (1997).
100.
See generally Low & Atkdnson, supra note 6, at B14.

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

18

[VoL 32.1

Additionally, there has been a marked increase in the
number of international business mergers, which forces those
corporations involved into a broader business and legal arena. As
a consequence of these factors, the international community has
found it necessary to instill confidence in investors, business, and
security markets by establishing a level playing field where
business and security transactions may occur. 10 1
A. The U.S. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct as a Model

As the world begins serious consideration of both costs of
business corruption and of ways to eliminate such corruption, the
FCPA naturally serves as an important factor in formulating
attitudes and policies toward business corruption. It is certain
that the FCPA has provided a relevant legislative model for other
multilateral organizations and nations because it remains the sole
statutory prohibition of bribery of foreign officials by business for
the purpose of obtaining contracts.
One of the key reasons that the FCPA has been a significant
factor in changing attitudes is that it has demonstrated an
alternative approach to eradicating business corruption, by
punishing the giver of bribes, rather than the recipient.1 0 2 Other
nations have laws prohibiting government officials from receiving
bribes, but the FCPA prohibitions focus on the corporations and
the corporate employees that are actually paying the bribes.
This shift in focus allows the inherent problems of corruption
to potentially be attacked on two fronts, by punishing both the
giver and the recipient of bribes. Consequently, many of the
multilateral and international coalitions now considering anticorruption measures are able to review the effectiveness of the
The
FCPA in prohibiting the corporate payment of bribes.
antibribery provisions of the FCPA are currently used as a model
in conventions adopted by the Organization of Economic
Cooperation and Development (OECD) and the Organization of
by
made
American States (OAS), as well as in recommendations 10
3
other non-governmental and multinational organizations.
Another key to the success of the FCPA is its accounting
provisions, i.e., its record keeping and internal control

101.

See id.
See 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1997).
103. See, e.g., OECD Convention, supra note 47; Summary of the
Organization of American States Inter-American Convention Against Corruption,
International Trade Administration, Chief Counsel for International Commerce
(last modified Apr. 22, 1998) <http://www.ita.doc.gov/legal/oas2.html>
[hereinafter Inter-American Convention Summary].
102.
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requirements.1 0 4 These provisions allow the government to more
readily detect and deter bribery, and increase corporate
accountability. It is interesting to note that the current efforts by
the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC), OECD, and the
OAS (discussed in further detail below) include the consideration
of standards to seek transparency in financial disclosure and
record-keeping practices, similar to those in the FCPA.10 5
1. International and Domestic Criticisms of the FCPA
a. International Reactions
No other countries followed the example set by the United
States in adopting the FCPA, despite repeated effort by the United
States to get them to pass similar legislation. Instead of following
the high moral path, they chose a more pragmatic approach
because in some countries bribery is "a way of life" and the
international companies doing business in those countries simply
viewed bribery as a necessary evil.'( 6 The restrictions on bribery
by U.S. companies gave an advantage to all of the other countries

who were not hampered by legislative prohibitions against using
bribes to obtain contracts. Some foreign countries allowed tax
deductions for the "commissions" paid to obtain favorable
treatment in contract negotiations.10 7
Some countries had
government officials who were designated to deal with the making
of such payments in a discreet fashion. Critics, who grew weary
of the United States promoting the passage of antibribery
legislation similar to the FCPA in other countries, accused the
l0 8
United States of "ethical imperialism."
b. Domestic Reactions
Domestic dissatisfaction grew after passage of the 1977 Act
as the U.S. business community began to argue that it was
suffering from an unfair disadvantage by doing business in
foreign countries in which companies from other nations, with

104. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1997).
105. See OECD Convention, supra note 47.
106. See Barbara Crutchfield George, The U.S. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct:
The Price Business is Payingfor the Unilateral Criminalizationof Bribery, 4 INT'L J.
MGMT. 391, 392 (1987).
107.
See Recommendation of the Council of the OECD on the Tax

Deductibility of Bribes to Foreign Government Officials, C(96)27/FINAL, Apr. 11,
1996, reprintedin 35 I.L.M. 1311.
108.
See RIcHARD T. DE GEORGE, COMPETING WITH INTEGRITY IN INTERNATIONAL
BUSINESS 103-04 (1993).
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which they were competing, had no legislative restrictions
regarding bribery. This dissatisfaction eventually forced Congress
to pass the amendments to the FCPA in 1988.109
The primary bases for objections to the 1977 Act by
international businesses were: 1) competition problems caused
by the unilateral position of the United States prohibiting
extraterritorial bribery; 11 0 2) vagueness of the statutory language
causing a corporate inability to determine whether actions were
legal; 1 11 and 3) broadness of the statutory language which made
corporations responsible for acts of which they had no
1 12
knowledge.
SEC registrants subject to the Act complained that
compliance with the Act's accounting provisions was costly and
confusing because the amount of disclosure required by the Act
was unclear.1 1 3 Extensive compliance efforts in financial record
keeping and internal controls was (and is) quite expensive, and
yet, insufficient compliance left a corporation vulnerable to an

enforcement action by the SEC.

The enforcement authority

granted to the SEC under the Act was of even greater concern to
penalties and, in
businesses because of the potential statutory
114
particular, the stringent criminal penalties.
There were so many complaints from companies doing
business abroad regarding the negative effect that the Act had on
their ability to compete for international business contracts that
Congress asked the General Accounting Office (GAO) to prepare a
report on the impact of the FCPA on U.S. businesses. 115 The GAO
Report was submitted in 1981. The GAO Report stated that thirty
percent of respondents experienced a decrease in overseas
business, and approximately seventy percent rated the clarity of
at least one of the antibribery provisions as inadequate or very
inadequate. 116
Critics in both the legal profession and business
community1 17 voiced criticism against key words and phrases

See Trade Act, supranote 3. Even in the 1988 amendment, Congress
109.
included a provision instructing the U.S. President to enter into multilateral
agreements with other countries which incorporated the antibribery approach
used by the FCPA. See id. at § 5003(d), 102 Stat. 1424 (amending 15 U.S.C. §
78dd-1).
See GAO REPORT, supranote 2, at i.
110.
111.
See id.
See id.
112.
Seeid. ati, 19, 21, 82.
113.
See generally 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1997).
114.
See generally GAO REPORT, supranote 2.
115.
116.
See id. at i-ii, 6.
Former Texaco CEO and President, James W. Kinnear, argues that
117.

along with the economic and moral disincentives to offer bribes, U.S. corporations
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that are not adequately defined." 8 In particular, the "reason to
know" provision caused a great deal of concern and was one of
the most controversial of the provisions in both the antibribery
and accounting sections of the FCPA. 1 19 Malcolm Baldridge,
Secretary of the Department of Commerce during the Reagan
administration, voiced his criticism on this provision in his
statement
to
a
Congressional
Subcommittee
Hearing:
"Businessmen do not thrive on ambiguities. They are fearful of
ambiguities. And this act is causing them trouble unless it's
clarified." 120 Companies particularly complained about not being
able to determine under what circumstances a company should
have "reason to know" that a prohibited payment would be made.
Moreover, a company was never certain whether any steps it had
taken were sufficient to defeat or at least minimize the likelihood
that it had "reason to know" of a prohibited payment. 121
As an indication of the level of dissatisfaction with the 1977
Act, amendments were introduced in Congress in 1980, 1981,
1984, and 1985.122 Finally Congress passed major amendments
to the Act in 1988, which considerably reduced the harshness of
the most stringent provisions. 123
Some examples include the
elimination of the "reason to know" standard of liability, a

clarification of the definition of "facilitating payments," and a
clarification of the meaning of the "reasonable assurances" and
"reasonable detail" standards on record keeping and internal
24
control compliance.L
2. Effectiveness of the FCPA
An evaluation of the effectiveness of the FCPA in reducing the
extent of bribery engaged in by U.S. corporations requires the
consideration of two vital issues. First, it can be argued that
compliance with the Act was costly and difficult for U.S.
corporations that found themselves at a competitive disadvantage

can now use the FCPA as an excuse to foreign agents for why they cannot offer a
bribe.
118.
See GAO REPORT, supranote 2, at a.
119.
See The Business Accounting and Foreign Trade SimplificationAct: Joint
Hearings on S. 430 Before the Subcomm. on Int'l Fin. and Monetary Pol'y and
Subcomm. on Securities of the Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Aff., 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 43 (1986).
120. Id.
121.
See id. at 42 (statement of Malcom Baldridge, Secretary, Department of

Commerce).
122.
See generally Laura E. Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What Is To
Be Done With the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431

(1987).
123.
124.

See Trade Act, supranote 3.
See id.
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in obtaining foreign business, because until now they have been
the only corporations subject to such restrictions.
In fact,
Commerce Department estimates put the cost to U.S. firms of
competitor's bribery at $15 billion in lost contracts.1 2 5 The
estimated loss in contracts serves as some evidence that U.S.
firms have reduced the extent of their involvement in prohibited
bribery and that the FCPA has therefore been effective.
Second, the current worldwide attention on the negative
ramifications of corporate bribery should lead to the adoption of
FCPA-type legislation by other nations. As discussed below,
multinational organizations such as OECD and OAS have already
adopted Conventions mandating such legislation for their
members.126 As other nations adopt such legislation, the
effectiveness of the FCPA in reducing business corruption should
increase.
Finally, it is important not to overlook the significance of the
provision in the FCPA that mandates that the U.S. President
pursue the negotiation of an international agreement prohibiting
bribery among the members of the OECD and submit a report to
127
Congress on the progress of the negotiations.
B. End of the Cold War
An important factor in the broadening of international
support of measures to prohibit corrupt business practices was
the end of the Cold War in 1989.128 Without the worries inherent
in the security threats of the Cold War and without the fear of
creating internal political instability, national leaders were able to
turn their attention to other matters, including corrupt political
and business practices.1 2 9 Former socialist nations transitioned
to a more market-based economy, forcing them to attempt to meet
traditional standards of accountability to compete for funds on

125.

See Thomas Omestad, Bye-bye to Bribes, The Industrial World Takes

Aim at Official Corruption,U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., Dec. 22, 1997, at 39, 43.
126.
See OECD Convention, supra note 47, at art. 1.
Inter-American
Convention Summary, supra note 103; Stuart Deming, Foreign Corrupt Practices,
32 INT'L LAW. 463 (1998).
127.
See 15 U.S.C.§ 78dd-1 (1997).
128.
See Peter Eigen, Chairman of TransparencyInternational,who though

acknowledging the importance of the end of the Cold War, stated, 'It]he timing
was propitious: international corruption had reached crisis-level proportion, and
many countries that were undergoing political transition were in desperate need
of stronger integrity systems." Eigen, supranote 6, at 158-59.
129. See Gail Edmondson et al., Europe'sNew Morality, Bus. WEEK INTL ED.,
Dec. 18, 1995, at 26.
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the same terms as other democratic countries, 130 and to enter the
international business environment. 1 3 With the former socialist
countries moving towards democracy and a free market system,
the United States found itself as the sole surviving superpower
with an ideology of democracy and capitalism. Now, as the world
emulates the democratic and capitalistic models, it finds itself
moving towards the globalization of securities markets and
132
business transactions.
C. FurtherIntegrationof Europe
Current integration developments in the European Union
(EU) are also a factor influencing international attitudes toward
business corruption. The recent Maastricht Treaty'- and the
draft Treaty of Amsterdam 134 significantly hastened the
integration process. The treaty provisions cede some of the
national sovereignty of the fifteen Member States to the EU
institutions.13 5
As centralized institutions of the EU are
strengthened during the process of integration, there is an
increased possibility that an anti-corruption Directive or
Regulation will be issued which replicates provisions of the U. S.
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.
The EU has formally opened negotiations to extend
membership to ten former Communist nations which will provide
the EU with the opportunity to become involved in the reform of
business practices as the countries change to a market

130. See generally Beverley Earle, The United States Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act and the OECD Anti-Bribery Recommendation: When Moral Suasion
Won't Work, Try the Money Argument, 14 DICK. J. INTL L. 207, 235 (1996).
131.
See Hotchldss, supranote 56.
132. See generally Fareed Zakaria, So Much for Globalization, NEWSWEEK,
Sept. 7, 1998, at 36.
133. Treaty on European Union, Feb. 7, 1992, 1992 O.J. (C224) 1/79
(official English text), 31 I.L.M. 247 (entered into force Nov. 1, 1993) [hereinafter
Maastricht Treaty]. Also note that the designation "European Union" has been
used after implementation of the Maastricht Treaty on November 1, 1993. The
term 'European Union" has political significance, the exact scope of which is not
yet fully determined. The nationals of its fifteen Member States are now citizens
of the Union.

See P.F.R.F. MATH[JSEN, A GUIDE TO EUROPEAN UNION LAW 3-7 (6th

ed. 1995).
134. The Treaty of Amsterdam, revising the treaties on which the EU is
founded, is currently being ratified by the Member States. It was drafted by
governmental representatives of the Member States at the Intergovernmental
Conference in 1996.
135. See Uncertainty Shrouds Vote on EU Treaty in Denmark, INT'l HERALD
TRIB., May 28, 1998, at 6; Danes Accepting EU Pact INTL HERALD TRIB., May 29,

1998, at 1; Treaty of Amsterdam Amending the Treaty on European Union, the
Treaties Establishingthe EuropeanCommunities, and CertainRelated Matters, (last
visited Jan. 5, 1999) <http://ue.eu.int/Amsterdam/en/treaty/treaty.htm>.
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13 6

economy.
It has been reported that the process will result in
the EU having a market of a half-billion people producing more
than twenty percent of the world's goods; "however, it will also
bring to present and future members wrenching problems of
adaptation." 13 7 Undoubtedly, conditions will be placed upon the
billions of dollars given by the EU to the candidate countries for
technical and financial reform. The conditions may well include
stipulations as to accounting practices and transparency, as well
as changes in the way in which they do business.
The recent establishment of the Economic and Monetary
Union (EMU), 13 8 which will bring a greater integration of Europe,
is an important factor that will increase the chances of the
adoption of more uniform and perhaps more stringent rules
governing corrupt business conduct.
In May 1998, the EU
ratified the European Commission's recommendation that the
currencies of eleven EU member states will be changed to the
Euro, a new single currency, effective January 1, 2002.139 The
eleven Member States will formally belong to the EMU on January
1, 1999.140 In order for the monetary conversion to be a success,
the Member States must forego more of their national sovereignty
as they become more subject to the rules and regulations of a
common governing authority of the bitterly-resisted European
super-state. 141 This places the participating Member States in the
position of having to conform' to the standards of business

conduct promulgated at the central level, rather than having the
independence inherent in national sovereignty.
D. InternationalBusiness Mergers
With innumerable international joint ventures, direct
investments, 142 and mergers, it is undeniable that business is a

136.
The countries that are being considered first are the Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Poland, and Slovenia. The other five countries that have been
promised serious consideration at a later date when their economic and political
institutions are judged to have met EU standards are Bulgaria, Latvia, Lithuania,
Romania, and Slovakia. See Joffe, supranote 6, at 6.
137.
Id.
138.
See Reginald Dale, Euro Brings Need for Accountability, INTL HERALD
TRIB., March 31, 1998, at 11.
139.
See John Vincour, Officially, the Euro Is On, INTL HERALD TRIB., Dec. 22,
1997, at 1.
140.
See Robert A. Levine, The Euro Will Arrive, but then Beware the Deluge,
INT'L HERALD TRIB., Apr. 25, 1998, at 6.
14 1.
See Joffe, supranote 6, at 7.
142. A U.S. financial company, Travelers Group Inc., purchased a twentyfive percent share of Nikko Securities Co., Japan's third largest brokerage
company. See Sandra Sugawara, Putting Together Cultures, INT'L. HERALD TRIB.,
June 2, 1998, at 13.
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pervasive global force. 143 The recent increase in the number of
international mega-mergers adds further impetus to the explosion
of international business relationships. During the course of
1998, giants in the industries announced mergers-the United
States' Chrysler Corporation and Germany's Daimler-Benz AG, 144
Germany's Allianz and Assurances Generales de France, Sweden's
Nordbanken and Finland's Merita, 145 Germany's Bertelsmann AG
and United States' Random House Inc.,1 46 and British Petroleum
of London and Amoco Corporation of Chicago. 147
The effect of these international mergers is to bring
companies that may have only been subject to domestic laws into
a broader legal framework in which there are regulations which
affect the way the companies do business. Also, the broader
business arena often forces companies to take a different
approach to the way they do business because they must adhere
to a more standardized code of conduct in order to retain the
confidence of the marketplace and raise necessary capital.
E. BorderlessGlobal Market
In today's world, goods, ideas, and capital move across
national borders with ease. 14 8 "[Tihe combination of explosive
growth in world trade, direct foreign investment, and cross-border
trading in stocks and bonds has created an ever tighter web of

connections among countries, all of which are in very different
stages of development." 14 9
The crises in Asia and Russia have served as a reminder of
the interdependent international environment in which we now
live. What might have been thought of as a regional crisis in the
past is now viewed as a global crisis with far-reaching global
15 0
challenges.

143.

See Iritani & Silverstein, supra note 6, at Al.

144.

See John Schmid, FastLanefor GermanFirms, INTL HERALD TRIB., May

8, 1998, at 1.
145.

See John-Thor Dahlburg, European Unions, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 1, 1998, at

146.

See John Schmid, German Media Giant Buys Random House, INTL.

Dl.
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 24, 1998, at 1.

147.
See Sallie Gaines, Amoco-BP Merger ClearsFinalHurdle, CHICAGO TRIB.,
Dec. 30, 1998 (visited Feb. 22, 1999) <http://chicagotribune.com/tools/search/
archives/archives.htm>.
148.
See Iritani & Silverstein, supranote 6, at A14.
149.
See Jeffrey E. Garten, The InternationalFinancialSystem is Crisis-Prone,
INT'IL HERALD TRIB., May 12, 1998, at 8.
150.
See David E. Sanger, A Year 04, Asian Crisis Just Keeps Deepening;
PlayedDown at First,It's Now Threateninga Global Depression, INTL HERALD TRIB.,
July 7, 1998, at 1 (giving examples of the effect of the Asian crisis on U.S.
manufacturers and farmers); John-Thor Dahlburg, Asian Blues Make Way to
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Closely attendant to the rapid acceleration of many countries
towards greater competition and free market capitalism is the
necessity for a change in the way these countries operate in the
global business environment. There has been recent conjecture,
however, that if Russia's experiment with the Western economic
model fails, the world may have reached its high-water mark of
the age of globalization. 15 1
1. Technological Advances
A primary reason for fundamental changes in the global
environment surely lies in the enormous technological advances

which have created a borderless global marketplace.

With the

advent of the amorphous and frontierless Internet, it is now
possible to easily engage in transactions across international
boundaries.1 5 2 Technological progress in
computers and
electronic communication has contributed to a complete

revolution in transaction services.1 5 3

One consequence of having such dramatic technological
advances is the creation of a global capital market, in which good
governance is necessary for successful functioning. Many in
international business, financial, and banking organizations
argue that corruption is injurious to the successful functioning of
a global capital market.154
Therefore, the need for legal
prohibitions against corruption becomes apparent as a necessary
mechanism in establishing a level playing field in global capital
markets. In turn, this is essential to the economic stability of the
world marketplace.
2. Deregulation
There have been massive efforts to deregulate the markets
around the world in an effort to bring a maximum number of
international businesses into a free market economy.
The

Distant Shores, L.A. TIMES, Aug. 9, 1998, at Al (noting the effect of the Asian
Crisis on European industry).
151.
See Zakaria, supranote 132.
152.
See Holly Hubbard Preston, The Ins and Outs of Trading Securities OnLine, INT'L. HERALD TRIB., Mar. 28, 1998, at 17 (discussing the challenges
associated with trading securities on-line for international investors).
153.
See MICHAEL G. HADJIMIcHALAKIS & KARMA G. HADJIMIcHALAKIS,
CONTEMPORARY MONEY, BANKING, AND FINANCIAL MARKETS 109, 110 (1995).
154.
See Michael H. Sutton, Chief Accountant of the SEC, Financial
Reporting and Investor Protection, Address at Baruch College (Oct. 20, 1997),
available on the Internet at <http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch201.txt>
(commenting on the important role that the financial deputy plays in obtaining

investor confidence and protecting investors).
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position of a free market economy immediately exposes
governments and businesses within the country to new kinds of
restraints on their conduct.
In furtherance of the deregulation effort, the World Trade
Organization (WTO) negotiated three major trade liberalization
accords in 1997.155 "In February, the WTO achieved a global
telecommunications deal, and in March countries accounting for
[ninety-five] percent of world trade in information technology
products agreed to phase out all tariffs by the year 2000."156

Finally, in December 1997, negotiators from 102 countries
finalized a global financial-services accord at WTO headquarters
in Geneva that "will liberalize trillions of dollars worth of trade in
the banking, insurance and brokerage sectors." I s7 The effect will
be to lower investment barriers worldwide that until now have
been heavily protected. The agreement applies to the 132
members of the WTO, covering $10 trillion worth of global
securities assets, $40 trillion of world banking assets, and $2
15 8
trillion in worldwide insurance premiums.
As a further example of deregulation occurring worldwide,
there have been efforts by the EU to construct a single European
market, which has led to the progressive dismantling of many of
the legal and regulatory barriers to open competition. 15 9 Also,
Japan, the world's second largest securities market, is undergoing
drastic changes while its "Big Bang financial deregulation
1 60
unfolds.
The opening of formerly domestic or regional markets to the
global environment necessitates a conversion of attitudes and
business practices to suit the standards of fair play increasingly
required in the world community. Transparency and

comparability of financial statements becomes a necessity to
ensure investors in the global capital market of corporate
accountability.
F. Recognition of the Economic Costs of Corruption
There are indications that the scope and mounting cost of
bribery in international business corruption have reached crisis
dimensions and are now at a critical point, where the costs simply

155. See Alan Friedman, World Pact in Finance is Reached, INTL HERALD
TRIB., Dec. 15, 1997, at 1 (outlining the "global financial services pact" that will
liberalize trade in the banking, insurance, and brokerage sectors).
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See id. The agreement will become effective in March, 1999.
159. See Dahlburg, supranote 132.
160. See Sugawara, supranote 142.
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cannot be borne any longer without having a detrimental impact
on international trade. 161 A recent publication, Grand Corruption:
How Business Bribes Damage Developing Countries, states that:
"Grand corruption has increased tremendously during the last
decade. What used to concern a relatively small number of people
working in a relatively small number of countries has now become
a major world-wide problem."1 6 2 The author, George MoodyStuart, claims that "by general consensus, there has been a
tremendous deterioration in the last ten to fifteen years, with
grand corruption becoming the general rule, rather than the
16 3
exception."
According to a recent U.S. News & World Report, a survey by
the World Bank of 3,600 firms in sixty-nine countries indicates
that forty percent of businesses are paying bribes.1 6 4 The same
article states that "German firms spend more than five billion
dollars a year on foreign bribes, and Commerce Department
estimates put the cost to U.S. firms caused by overseas
competitors' engagement in bribery at $15 billion in lost overseas
contracts per year."165
This increased focus on the economic costs of corruption, as
well as the other factors discussed above, further highlights
international attention on the need for a level playing field in
global capital markets and business transactions.
This has
resulted in worldwide antibribery alliances in which governments,
the business sector, and NGOs have become active.

IV. INTERNATIONAL COOPERATIVE EFFORTS
AND THEIR FUTURE DIRECTION
There are numerous governmental, quasi-governmental, and
NGOs that are currently involved in international cooperative
efforts to take action against those engaging in corrupt business
practices. These agencies are important because they have the
potential to provide substantial help in the fight against
corruption.
According to one author there are five styles of
intergovernmental cooperation in international organizations:
coordination, cooperation, harmonization, association, parallel

161. See Salbu, supra note 6, at 236 (noting that despite efforts to curb
bribery, "corruption in overseas markets remains a daunting problem').
162. MOODY-STUART, supranote 99.
163. Id.
164. See Omestad, supranote 125, at 42.
165. Id. at 43.

1999]

GLOBAL ANTIBRIBERY LEGISLATION

national action, and supra-nationalism. 166 Depending upon the
nature of the organization and the extent to which its members
are willing to become involved, most of the organizations could
provide a viable forum for the promulgation of guidelines that
harmonize prohibitions against corrupt business practices.
A. FinancialStandard Setting Organizations
and FinancialInstitutions
The "combination of explosive growth in world trade, direct
foreign investment and cross-border trading in stocks and bonds
has created an ever tighter web of connections among countries,"
making it necessary for both governmental and quasigovernmental agencies to address the problem of business
16 7
corruption and corporate accountability.
1. The International Accounting Standards Committee: The SEC
Role in Formulating International Accounting Standards
Since the SEC has been an active leader in requiring a high
level of corporate accountability from corporations trading
securities in the United States, it can be anticipated that it will
take an active role in encouraging international support and
adoption of "initiatives by international bodies of professional
accountants to establish appropriate international standards that
might be used for multinational offerings."16 8 The U.S.. securities
statutes, as implemented by the SEC, provide a successful model
for establishing healthy capital markets.
A benefit of the disclosure requirements required by the U.S.
capital market is that potential investors are provided
"transparent portrayals of the risks and opportunities
involved." 169
Comparable and transparent financial reporting
that allows individual and institutional investors to make their

166. The five stages are described as follows: "Coordination is a way of
producing common policies among actors which have legal, or formal competence
in particular policy areas"; cooperation is "a limited involvement of [countries] in a
joint enterprise" of limited scope, duration, and objective; harmonization involves
a systematic harmonization of national laws and policies regarding a specific
issue; association involves the solving of practical issues but does not attend to
more difficult political issues; parallel national actions involve coordination of
national policies in such a way that national policies remain different; and supranationalism involves the delegation of responsibility for policy-making and
implementation in a specific area to an international organization. See Paul
Taylor, Co-Ordination in International Organization, in FRAMEWORKS FOR
INTERNATIONAL CO-OPERATION 12-14 (A.J.R. Groom & Paul Taylor eds., 1990).
167.
See Garten, supranote 149.
168.
1996 SEC ANN. REP., ACCOUNTING AND AUDITING MATTERS.
169.
Sutton, supra note 154.
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own evaluations of a company's financial health protects the
interests of investors, 170 and therefore facilitates the ease with
which corporations are able to raise capital as necessary.
The SEC is currently a prominent member in the
International Organization of Securities Commissions (IOSC).
IOSC, in conjunction with the International Accounting
Standards Committee (LASC), has agreed to the development of a
comprehensive set of international accounting standards that

would be utilized by multinational corporations in cross-border
securities offerings in all global markets.1 7 1 The IASC's initial
goal was to have this set of international standards completed by
March 1998, however, work on the project still continues.1 7 2
The SEC has taken the position, as noted by Chief
Accountant Michael Sutton, that there are three key elements
necessary for these international accounting standards to gain
acceptance:
1) the standards must include a core set of
accounting pronouncements that constitute a comprehensive,
generally-accepted basis of accounting, 2) "the standards must be
of 'high quality'--they need to result in comparability and
transparency,"1 7 3 and 3) the standards must then be rigorously
interpreted and applied. 174
The SEC believes that these three elements are integral to the
success of international harmonization of accounting standards
because they "assure the quality of the standards promulgated
and their acceptability to IOSC members."1 7 5
If these three
elements are met, "the SEC will consider accepting the core
standards in securities offerings by foreign issuers in the U.S."1 7 6
It is critical for foreign corporations, who are either listing their
securities on U.S. Exchanges or anticipating doing so to remain
aware and informed of the development of these standards.
Additionally, corporations need to consider the impact of the
adoption of international standards on their compliance with the
FCPA's accounting provisions. Currently corporate compliance
with the financial record keeping and internal control provisions

170.

See id-

171. See id.
172. See Michael H. Sutton, Chief Accountant of the SEC International
Harmonization of Accounting Standards, Address at the American Accounting
Association 1997 Annual Meeting (Aug. 17, 1997), available on the Internet at
<http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch174.txt>. See also IASC home page,
<http://www.iasc.org.uk/news/cenS_133.htm>

(stating that the IOSC project

assessing IASC core standards is still underway).

173. Id.
174. See id.
175. Michael H. Sutton, Chief Accountant of the SEC, Address at the 1996
AICPA Conference on Current SEC Developments (Feb. 15, 1996), available on the
Internet at <http://www.sec.gov/news/speeches/spch076.txt>.
176.

Id.
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is achieved by utilizing the body of generally-accepted accounting
principles adopted by the private standard-setting entity known
as the Financial Accounting Standards Board under the
1 77
supervision of the SEC.
It seems that the SEC will continue to utilize GAAP as now
known, even with the adoption of international standards. As
stated by Michael Sutton, "[t]he sovereignty of national standard
setters and regulators must be respected. It is likely that the
need for national tailoring of accounting and disclosure rules will
178
continue."
The SEC can "make a tremendous contribution to the
development of international accounting standards." 17 9 The U. S.
securities and accounting regulatory system has been specifically
shaped to meet the needs of investors and capital markets.1 8 0 A
significant reason for the success of our capital markets is due to
the high quality of the accounting and disclosure standards used
by companies subject to SEC jurisdiction. 1 8 1 For this reason the
SEC can "make a tremendous contribution to the development of
international accounting standards."18 2
The SEC needs to maintain a strong and influential role in
ensuring that the international standards developed are as
rigorous, thorough, and of the same high quality that the GAAP
has been in order to ensure that these standards will result in the
level of corporate accountability necessary for both healthy capital
markets and global elimination of corrupt business practices.
2. International Organization of Securities Commissions
The International Organization of Securities Commissions
(IOSC) is a non-profit association of securities regulatory
organizations. It has 135 members, including twelve in the
United States. 183 The SEC is a prominent member. The SEC sits
on the IOSC Technical Committee, which is composed of sixteen
regulatory agencies that regulate some of the world's largest and
most internationalized securities markets. 18 4 The Technical
Committee is responsible for 10SC's role in the development of

177. See SEC Statement of Policy on the Establishment and Improvement of
Accounting Principles and Standards, Accounting Series Release No. 150 (Dec.
20, 1973).
178. Sutton, supranote 175.
179. Id.
180. See id

181.

See id.

182.

Id.

183.

See SEC REPORT ON PROMOTING GLOBAL PREEMINENCE OF AMERICAN

SECURITY MARKETs (Oct. 1997).
184. See id.
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internationally accepted accounting standards, with its attendant
emphasis on the need for transparency and corporate
accountability among corporations competing for capital in
borderless markets. 185
3. International Monetary Fund
The Washington-based International Monetary Fund (IMF)
was created after World War II in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire
by the United Nations to help rebuild the global financial
system. 186
It was specifically created to provide a central
authority "for consultation and collaboration on international
monetary problems." 18 7
The IMF, with its more than two
thousand employees, has been described by some as a "global
watchdog" to determine when and where a financial crisis may
occur. 188 It then infuses money into the economy, acting as
catalyst to restore the private sector's confidence in the system
and to attract money from other sources.18 9 It also takes the lead
in trying to force the borrowing country to take steps necessary to
fix the economy. 190 Thus, IMF money comes with many strings
attached.191
The IMF has been involved in several well publicized bailouts
in the last few years, including Mexico, Thailand, South Korea,
and Indonesia.19 The IMF has the power to attach conditions on
the money that it infuses into a country's economy; many of these
conditions affect or eliminate corrupt business practices that
undermine the economic stability of the country.' 9 3
As an
example, under the terms of an IMF agreement with Indonesia for
billions of dollars of aid, the youngest son of former President
Suharto was required to give up the monopoly he held on the
production of cloves, a key ingredient in the sweet cigarettes that

185.
186.

See id.
See Tom Petruno, The Financial 'White Knight': 1MF Demystified, L.A.

TIMES, Nov. 22, 1997, at Al.

187. Id.
188. See id.
189. See id.
190. See id.
191. See id. The IMF funding pool is the sum of subscriptions by the IMF's
181 member nations, which essentially keep a share of their national currencies
on deposit with the IMF. The agency deals only with a recipient country's central
bank for financial authority, feeding money directly into that institution and thus
bolstering the financial reserves ultimately backing the government.
192. See Paul Blustein, Hard Part Begins for Seoul and the MP, INTL.
HERALD TRIB., Nov. 24, 1997, at 1; Evelyn Iritani, Pacific Blues, Asian Crisis to
DominateAPEC ForumAgenda,L.A. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1997, at Dl.
193. See IMP Issues Guidance Note on Countering Corruption, TI Newsletter,
Sept. 1997, at 8; IMF Newsbrief No. 97/15, Aug. 4, 1997.
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are popular in Indonesia, in which he received tax breaks and
other special concessions. 194
Close friends of then President

Suharto lost lucrative cartels on plywood, paper, and cement
distribution, as well as government support for an expensive and
195
economically questionable aircraft building enterprise.
James Wolfenson, president of the World Bank, claims that
"corruption is the biggest issue on the minds of voters and the
single inhibiting factor" for private investment. 19 6 The World
Bank and the IMF are increasingly vocal about refusing loans to
countries who are unable or unwilling to rid themselves of
97
bribery, kickbacks, and political payoffs.1
The IMF adopted stringent guidelines for promoting public
sector transparency and accountability in the service of creating a
framework for sustained growth. 198
These guidelines came
immediately after the IMF declaration,
Partnership for
Sustainable Growth of September 29, 1996, in which "promoting
good governance in all its aspects, including ensuring the rule of
law, improving the efficiency and accountability of the public
sector, and tackling corruption" was identified as an essential
element of a framework within which economies prosper. 199 The
IMF is committed to a "more proactive approach in advocating
policies and the development of institutions and administrative
systems that eliminate the opportunity for bribery, corruption,
and fraudulent activity in
the management of public
resources."2° As indicated by a recent article in the Wall Street
Journal, entitled "Why America Needs the IMF," these efforts find
20
much praise in the American press. '

4. The World Bank
The World Bank, also known as the International Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, was developed as a complement
to the short-term capital strategies of the IMF. 2 ° 2
It was

194.

See Seth Mydans, Suharto Agrees to End Monopolies: F Deal Would

Dismantle CartelsofFamily and Friends,INTL HERALD TRIB., Jan. 16, 1998, at 1.

195.

See id.

196.

Sougata Mukheijee, Open Markets Spawn Corruption, Bus. NEWs,

Sept.

22, 1997, at 2.
197. See id.
198. See F Adopts Guidelines Regarding Governance Issues, News Brief
No. 97/15 (Aug. 4, 1997) <http://www.im.org/external/np/sec/nb/1997/

NB9715.htm>.
199. Id.
200. Id.
201. Lawrence Summers, Asia's Reckoning: Why America Needs the M
WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 1998, at A14.
202. The World Bank Group Homepage (visited Jan. 5, 1999)
<http://www.worldbank.org>.
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established at Bretton Woods at the same time as the IMF. 20 3
The World Bank focuses on long-term development, leaving
liquidity funding to the IMF.20 4 It helps finance banking and
corporate reform and projects that provide a social cushion to the
poor and unemployed in emerging countries. 20 5 It stimulates
productive investment in developing countries by lending capital
2
for such projects as energy and transportation. 06
Within the World Bank Group, entities such as the
International Development Association (IDA) and the International
Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD), have issued
anti-corruption guidelines. 2 ° 7 "The guidelines provide that, upon
discovery of fraudulent or corrupt conduct by a bidder or
borrower, the bank will reject the bidder's proposal for awards,
cancel the remaining portions of loans . . . and debar the
borrower from future World Bank financing for a stated period of
time or indefinitely. "20 8 Guidelines such as these, that are linked
to specific economic and financial consequences when corruption
is detected, reflect the growing reluctance of international
agencies to provide capital to projects riddled with corruption.
B. MultinationalOrganizationsand MultilateralAgreements

1. Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD) was established in Paris, France in 1960 in order to
achieve the highest sustainable economic growth and employment
and a rising standard of living in member countries while
maintaining financial stability, and thus to contribute to: the
development of the world economy; sound economic expansion in
member countries as well as non-member countries in the
process of economic development; and the expansion of world
trade on a multilateral, non-discriminatory basis in accordance
with international obligations. 209 Later, it also assumed the task
of coordinating assistance to developing countries.
The twenty original members of the OECD included: Austria,
Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal,

203.
204.
205.

See id.
See 0d
See id.

206.

See id.

207.

See Low& Atldnson, supranote 6, at B15.

208.
209.

Id.
Id.
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Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and
the United States. Between 1964 and 1994 five more countries
-joined: Japan, Finland, Australia, New Zealand, and Mexico.
a. Recommendations on Bribery
Another determinant of global change in attitudes towards
business corruption has been the efforts expended as a result of
the mandate in the 1988 FCPA amendments 21 0 that the President

of the United States negotiate an international agreement among

2 11
the OECD members to prevent bribery of foreign officials.
During President Clinton's term in office, the U.S. government
complied with the 1988 mandate, and began to facilitate an
international antibribery agreement among OECD members. This
mandate resulted in the 1994 Recommendation of the Council of
2 12
OECD on Bribery in International Transactions.
Although the Recommendation is not legally binding, it
encourages OECD member countries to criminalize the making of
bribes to foreign officials in connection with international
business transactions. 21 3 A number of Member nations already
prohibited bribe taking by providing a "basis for the prosecution
of bribery of foreign officials, including Canada, Greece, Hungary,
Korea, Mexico, Sweden, Turkey and the United Kingdom. 2 1 4 By
comparison, the Recommendation promotes legislation targeting
the bribe giver, such as a corporation paying bribes to a foreign
government in order to obtain contracts.
Subsequent to the issuance of the Recommendation there
have been a number of working groups within the OECD dealing
with the problem of corruption.2 15
The Working Group on
Bribery, the most important of these groups, has given priority to
the need to criminalize bribery of foreign public officials. The
Group's most pressing issue was deciding whether such
criminalization should be implemented as model legislation or
multilateral convention. On May 23, 1997,the OECD Member
countries took a further step in fighting corrupt business

210.

15 U.S.C.A. § 78dd-1 (1997).

211.
See id.; ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT,
OECD ECONOMIC OUTLOOK 57 (1995); CORPORATE COUNSEL'S INTERNATIONAL ADVISER,

SPECIAL REPORT, Oct. 1988, at 4; Adam Fremantle & Sherman Katz, The Foreign
CorruptPractices Act Amendments of 1988, 23 INTI LAw. 755, 764 (1989); Earle,
supra note 130, at 208.
212.
See OECD Initiatives to Fight Corruption, Note by Secretary General to
the OECD Council at Ministerial level (May 1997).
213.
See id.
214.
Id.
215.
See id.
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practices by adopting a Revised Recommendation of the Council
2 16
on Combating Bribery in International Business Transactions.
Since the adoption of the 1994 Recommendation and the
1997 Revised Recommendation, Belgium, the Netherlands,
Norway, and Germany have drafted legislation to criminalize
bribery. 2 17 For example, Germany has, in accordance with the
OECD Convention, submitted a draft of legislation to
parliament.2 1 8 According to the German Ministry of Justice, the
2 19
passage of the law is expected soon.

In addition to the above Recommendations, the OECD
adopted a resolution in 1996 aimed at the few Member States
which still permitted corporate tax deductions of bribery
payments made by business. 220 The resolution mandates that all
221
OECD Members reject or abolish such tax deductions.
b. OECD Convention
On November 21, 1997 the OECD adopted the Convention on
Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in International
Business Transactions (OECD Convention). 22 2 Five non-member
countries, Argentina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Chile, and the Slovak
Republic, joined as signatories. 223
With their signatures on
December 17, 1997, the participating countries committed
themselves to ratify and implement the OECD Convention as
national legislation by December 31, 1998.
The formal requirement for the Convention's entry into force
was the ratification by five of the ten countries having the ten
largest export shares of OECD countries, and representing at
least sixty percent of the combined total exports of those
countries. The OECD Convention entered into force on February

216.

OECD, Recommendation of the Coundik Combating Bribery in International

Business Transacions(visited Sept 14, 1998) <http://www.oecd.org/daf/cmis/bnbery/
bribrecm.htm>.
217.
See id.
218.
See Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung: Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu
dem Obereinkommen vom 17. December 1997 fiber die Bekimpfung der

Bestechung auslindischer Amtstr~ger im Gesetzentwurf der Bundesregierung:
Entwurf eines Gesetzes zu dem 0bereinkommen vom 17. December 1997 fiber
die BekAmpfung der Bestechung auslindischer Amtstrdger im internationalen
Geschdftsverkehr (Gesetz zur Bekrampfung internationaler Bestechung-IntBestG).
219.
Letter HA4-4027-3-230234/98.
220.
See OECD Looking to Encourage Non-Member Countries to Adopt AntiBribery Laws, Daffy Tax Rep. (BNA) (Apr. 17, 1996).
221.
See id.
222.
See OECD Convention, supra note 47; see also Deming, supra note

126.
223.

See OECD Convention, supranote 47.
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following Canada's deposit of its instrument

of

ratification.
The Convention obligates the parties to the convention to
make bribery of foreign public officials a criminal act.2 2 4 Similar
to the provisions of the FCPA, "facilitatin.
payments are
exempt. 2 25 The general language agreed upon for penalties was
"effective, proportionate and dissuasive criminal penalties" to
those who bribe foreign public officials. 2 26 Unlike the PCPA, the
Convention does not specifically cover political parties. However,
the Convention prohibits business-related bribes to foreign public
officials made through political parties and party officials, and
also includes
bribes directed to political parties by public
22 7
officials.
Following the corporate accountability approach of the FCPA,
the Convention provides that participating OECD countries must
take necessary measures, within the existing structure of their
laws and regulations, to prohibit the establishment of off-thebooks accounts and similar practices used to bribe or hide the
2 28
bribery of foreign public officials.
The U.S. Congress 22 9 has ratified and implemented the
Convention in the 1998 International Antibribery Act. 23 0 This Act
became effective as public law on November 10, 1998.231 The
Working Group has also ascertained that Germany, the Czech
Republic, and Belgium have submitted the Convention to their
23 2
individual legislative bodies for review and vote.
The Working Group also has considered that certain
measures, in addition to those specifically targeting bribery, offer
significant possibilities to fight business corruption including,
accounting, record keeping, and auditing requirements similar to
those incorporated in the FCPA.

224. Seeid. atart. 1, 2.
225. See id.
226. Id. at art. 3, 1. Countries whose legal systems lack the concept of
criminal corporate liability must provide for equivalent non-criminal sanctions,
including monetary penalties. A further requirement is that countries be able to
seize or confiscate the bribe and bribe proceeds or property of similar value, or
that monetary sanctions of comparable effect be applicable. See id. at art 3, 2.
227.
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.

See Deming, supra note 126, at 464.
See OECD Convention, supranote 47, at art. 8,
See id.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1.
See id.
See supranote 220.
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c. Involvement in Corporate Governance Issues
Recently, an international panel submitted recommendations

2
to the OECD on international corporate governance issues. 3

The panel is involved in trying to improve the accountability of
non-U.S. companies to their shareholders. It should be noted
that interest in the area of accountability has been further
underscored by the release of an international survey entitled
Furtheringthe Global Dialogue on Corporate Governance in which
fund managers and more than 350 international investors 23in4
Australia, France, Britain, and the United States participated.
A significant percentage supported the development of a global set
23 5
of corporate governance standards.
d. OECD Development Centre on Corruption Issues
In February 1999, the Centre is organizing a conference to
examine the various anti-corruption measures of the private
sector in developing countries, 23
and
to make aid and lending
6
agencies sensitive to these issues.
2. Organization of American States: Inter-American Convention
Against Corruption
In 1996, the first multilateral legal framework to target
business corruption was drafted by the Organization of American
States (OAS). This agreement, known as the Inter-American
Convention Against Corruption, requires signatories to attack the
problem of bribery and corruption in international business by
agreeing to adopt laws that are "roughly equivalent" to the
provisions of the FCPA. 23 7

The OAS has thirty-four Western

238
Hemisphere members, including the United States.
The Convention seeks to promote and strengthen cooperation
to "prevent, detect, punish and eradicate corruption in the

233.

See Kenneth N. Gilpin, Shareholder Rights Go Global, INT'L HERALD

TRIB., Apr. 7, 1998, at 11.
234. The international survey was commissioned by Russell Reynolds
Associates, an executive-search firm. See id.
235.

See id.

236.

See La convention de l'OCDE sur la lutte contre la corruption entrera en

vigueur lafturier 1999, <http://www.OECD.org/news-andevents/communique/
nw98-124f.htm>.
237. See Gilles Trequesser, Inter-American Convention Signed Against
Corruption, REUTERS EUR. Bus. REP., Mar. 29, 1996.

238.

See Low &Atldnson, supranote 6.
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performance of public functions."2 3 9
The Convention also
supports asset seizure, extradition of charged parties, and
evidence-gathering cooperation between signatories. 2 4°
The
Convention is committed to seeking regularity and transparency
in financial disclosure and record-keeping practices. 24 '
The
Convention's prohibitions extend beyond those of the FCPA by
targeting illicit enrichment of the recipient, as well as the giver of
2 42
the bribe.
3. United Nations
In 1995, a United Nations committee drafted a code of
conduct that addresses the problem of public officials accepting
bribes in exchange for favorable treatment. 24
In 1996, a U.S.
delegation proposed a United Nations declaration calling for
international transparency in accounting standards, elimination
of tax deductions for corrupt payments, accurate record-keeping
practices, and international cooperation in the investigation of
2
bribery. "
The United Nations Resolution passed on July 21, 1997,
based on the recommendation of the Economic and Social
Council.
The Resolution is by far the most extensive and
significant declaration in support of the criminalization of bribery
in international commercial transactions. It recalls and reaffirms
five previous resolutions against corruption and calls upon
member states to develop and ratify "where appropriate,
corruption."24

international instruments against
4. European Union

Of great importance is the European Union's Convention on
the Fight Against Corruption Involving Officials of the European
Communities or Officials of Member States of the European Union
(EU Convention) of May 26, 1997.246 It criminalizes bribery of EU

239. Inter-American Convention Summary, supranote 103.
240. See United States Signs OAS Convention on Preventing Bribery,
Corruption,Intl Trade Daily (BNA) (June 17, 1996).
241. See id.
242. See id.
243. See Samia Nakhoul, U.N. Wants Anti-Graft Code for Officials, REUTERS
WORLD SERVICE, May 1, 1995.
244.
See Thalif Deen, U.S. Seeks U.N. DeclarationAgainst Bribery, INTER
PRESS SERVICE, July 23, 1996.

245. InternationalCooperationAgainst Corruptionand Bribery in International
Commercial Transactions,E.S.C. Res. 1997/25, 36th plen. mtg. (1997), available
on the Internet at <gopher://gopher.un.org/00/esc/recs/ 1997/E-RES97.25>.
246. See OFFICE OF THE CHIEF COUNSEL FOR INTL COMMERCE, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, ANTI-CORRUPTION REVIEW 18; see also Deming, supranote 126.
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officials, in addition to bribery of public officials of EU member
states. However, it does not address transnational bribery with
foreign officials of countries that are not members of the EU. 24 7
It has been suggested that EU competition law designed to
guarantee a market without obstacles to free competition might
be used as a legal instrument against corruption, since corruption
clearly "appears as a factor of distortion of trade flows and
competition." 2 48 Further, presently there are negotiations within
the EU to criminalize bribery by the private sector. 2 49
The Joint EU-United States Action Plan dedicated to
"[p]romoting peace and stability, democracy and development
around the world" expressly supports the OECD Recommendation
on Bribery in International Transactions, which is identified as
one way of "[c]ontributing to the expansion of world trade and
25 0
closer economic relations."
5. World Trade Organization
The World Trade Organization (WTO) is another international
organization that has recently begun to take a position against
bribery and corruption in government procurement practices. 2 s
The WTO, which is composed of 132 member nations, recently
celebrated the fiftieth anniversary of the founding of the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the forerunner to the World
Trade Organization. 25 2 At the founding meeting, known as the
Uruguay Round, the issue of targeting corruption in the
253
government procurement process was raised.
The WTO was formed at the end of World War II in order to
create an international trade organization.25 4 An interim trade
agreement was signed, the General Agreement on Tariffs and

247. See Low & Burton, supranote 51.
248. MOODY-STUART, supranote 99, at 69.
249. See Letter from the Federal Ministry of Justice of the Federal Republic
of Germany to the Authors (on file with authors).

250.

The European Union, Joint EU-US Action Plan (visited Sept 18, 1998)

<http://www.eurunion.org/partner/actplan.htm>.
"Ve will combat corruption
and bribery by implementing the 1994 OECD Recommendation on Bribery in
International Transactions." Id.
251.
See Salbu, supranote 6, at 235.
252.
See WTO Director General Renato Ruggiero, WTO from Vision to
Reality: The Multilateral Trading System at Fifty, Address to the Brookings
Institution Forum "The Global Trading System: A GATT 50th Anniversary Forum'

(Mar. 4, 1998).
253. See id.
254. See id.
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Trade (GAIT), on October 30, 1947.255 "The agreement was not a
treaty, but was instead acceded to by means of a Provisional
Protocol of Application." 25 6 The main purpose of the WTO is to
create a framework for the regulation of international trade and to
handle the supervision of the compliance of national policies
within this framework. 25 7 It has been deemed by some to be "the
most significant event in the process of globalization in this half of
258
the century."
Members commit themselves to abide by the trade
agreements that are part of the documentary structure of the
WTO. A mechanism is provided through which members can
9
25
enforce compliance of others within the WTO.

In 1996, the United States specifically included "the failure to
enforce anticorruption laws in the government procurement
2 60
context as a trade barrier in the Uruguay Round Agreements."
In so doing, the United States altered the perception of business
corruption from a moral concern to an international trade
concern. 2 61
As a consequence, the 1996 WTO Ministerial
Declaration included establishing a group to study transparency
262
in government procurement practices.
C. Non-Governmental OrganizationsDedicated to
EradicatingBusiness Corruption

1. Transparency International
No other non-government organization is as prominent an
international force in combating corruption than the
Transparency International (TI). Established in Europe in 1993,
TI is a Berlin-based "global coalition against corruption" that has
branched out into countries throughout the world. 26 3
26 4
on building systems that combat corruption.

It focuses

255.
See Philip M. Nichols, Corruption in the World Trade Organization:
Discerningthe Limits of the World Trade Organization'sAuthority, 28 N.Y.U. J. INTL
L. & POL. 711,711 & n.1 (1996).
256.
Id.
257.
See id.
258.
Id. at711-12.
259.
See id. at 715.
260.
See Low & Burton, supranote 51, at B14.
261.
See id.
262.
See id.
263.
See Edmondson et al., supranote 129, at 103.
264.
The Mission Statement includes a rationale which states: "Corruption
is one of the greatest challenges of the contemporary world. It undermines good

government, fundamentally distorts public policy, leads to the misallocation of
resources, harms the private sector and private sector development and
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TI is a conglomeration of business and government veterans
from around the world who are trying to promote international
business ethics. Combatting bribery and corruption is at the
forefront of their list. Peter Eigen, TI's chairman and a former
senior official with the World Bank, says: "We recognize the
realities of international commerce and competition, and our
approach must be evolutionary."2 65 According to Mr. Eigen,
"[c]orruption has become a major world problem, standing
alongside those of overpopulation, environmental degradation,
AIDS, and poverty." 2 66
TI, unlike most international banking, business, and
governmental organizations, not only promotes a financial agenda
(addressing the cost of bribery, impairment to free market exchanges,
and competition), but also emphasizes the detrimental influence on
democratic systems. In the words of Mr. Eigen, "[bly undermining
trust in political institutions and public officials and by distorting
government policy against the best interests of the majority, corruption
impairs the process of democracy."2 6 7 TI's phenomenal success is
evident in the broad network of national chapters and international
conferences and publications that focus on issues of corruption.
Building coalitions based on influential elements of civil society, rather
than establishing confrontational agendas, has proved to be an
effective policy by which TI has gained the respect and cooperation of
multinational organizations and governments.
One of its widely publicized activities is an annual survey
ranking countries based on a corruption perception index, the TI
Corruption Perception Index. 2 68 This has been a very effective
measure in exposing countries that are perceived as being
corrupt. Although there are almost 200 sovereign states, fewer
than 100 countries are included in the 1998 Index because there
must be a minimum number of four surveys analyzed to be
included. 2 69 TI places the emphasis on the scores out of a
maximum of ten points rather than on the ranking of the
2 70
country.

particularly hurts the poor." Transparency International,
Transparency
Internationalpublishes 1997 Corruption PerceptionIndex (visited Sept. 26, 1998)

<http://www.transparency.de/documents/press-releases/1997/1997.31.7.cpi.
html>.
265.

Id.

266. Id. at 168.
267. Eigen, supranote 6, at 160.
268. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index of July 31,
1997 (visited Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.transparency.de/documents/pressreleases/ 1997/1997.31.7.cpi.html>.

269. See id.
270. See id. The emphasis is on the scores because "in many cases a
number of countries have virtually the same scores. Also the rank may have
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The Index is published in cooperation with Johann Graf
Lambsdorff at the University of G6ttingen, and has become an
internationally acknowledged instrument for measuring corrupt
practices as perceived by business people. 2 7 1 The survey has
produced evidence that no region of the world can claim moral
superiority on the issue of corruption. In the 1998 Index released
September 22,1998, Denmark had a perfect score of ten with nine
surveys used, and ranks number one among the eighty-five
countries ranked. 2 72 The U.S. has a score of 7.5 with eight

surveys used (with a standard deviation of .9), and is ranked
number seventeen, tying with Austria in rank and score. 2 73 The
country that is perceived as the worst in terms of corruption is
Cameroon, with four surveys used. 2 74 The 1998 Index includes a
standard deviation figure that has not been used before, and that
indicates differences in the values of the sources; the greater the
variance, the greater the differences of perceptions of a country
among the surveys used.
TI has placed priority on developing a separate Bribery Index
of Leading Exporting Nations that will measure the sources of
international corruption, although there are concerns about both
the high cost and reliability of the data obtained.2 7 5 According to
a statement from TI, "this will shine the light on the countries
2 76
that are the homes of the bribe-paying corporations."
2. Other Non-Governmental Organizations
A pioneer in the fight for heightening awareness of corruption
is the Hong Kong based Independent Commission Against
Corruption (ICAC), which originated in 1974 as a law enforcement
agency developed to combat the then widespread corruption in
Hong Kong. ICAC started to convene international conferences
(i.e., International Anti-Corruption Conferences) in 1981, and
organized subsequent conferences in Washington D.C., New York,
Sydney, Amsterdam, Cancun, and Beijing.27 7 ICAC has also

slipped from the prior year, but the score is actually higher out of ten than in the
prior year.
271.
See Peter Eigen, The Role of the CPI, Statement by the Chairman of the
Board of Directors of Transparency International (visited Jan. 5, 1999)

<http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi//cpi-role.html>.
272. Transparency International, Corruption Perception Index of Sept. 22,
1998 <http://www.transparency.de/documents/cpi/index.html>.
273.
See id.
274.
See id.
275.
See id.
276.
Id.
277.
See
Transparency
International,
International Anti-Corruption
Conference (IACC): Anti-Corruption Conference History (visited Feb. 10, 1999)
<http://www.transparency.de/iacc/pastiacc.htm>.
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worked towards the establishment of a network of investigative
cooperation between. countries. 27 8 The conferences helped
generate interest and galvanize cooperation in the exchange of
intelligence between senior officials engaged in anti-corruption
activities. The ICAC is credited with the reduction of business
corruption in Hong Kong.
In many countries around the world, governmental and NGO
units have sprung up to address issues of corruption and to find
instruments for prevention and prosecution. One example is the
Independent Commission Against Corruption.2 7 9 Its efforts have
resulted in 115 formal investigations, and the release of the
publication, Practical Guide to CorruptionPrevention.28 0 Another
example is the Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia (ACA) which
began its operations in 1967. Its new mission statement of 1996
focuses on "a concerted effort in the fight against corruption,
while at the same time to devise and to fine-tune other workable
28 1
solutions."
The National Whistleblower Center (NWC), established in
Washington, D.C., in 1988, deserves credit for becoming a major
force in uncovering bribery. A non-profit organization that aims
at protecting the employee's right to "blow the whistle" on major
issues of public importance, it offers protection to those in the
best position to go public about corrupt practices, i.e., employees
of the paying company. Under the False Claims Act of 1863, such
employees are entitled to a share of any savings made by the
Federal Government as a result of their information. 28 2 According
to Moody-Stuart, "such payments have run into millions of
283
dollars."
In an effort to support the OECD resolutions on business
corruption, in 1996 the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC)
28 4
rewrote its Rules of Conduct to Combat Extortion and Bribery.
The ICC Recommendations to Governments and International
Organizations on Extortion and Bribery suggests a range of
preventive measures (mostly disclosure and auditing procedures),
and calls on governments to cooperate and assist in investigation

278.

See id.

279. ICAC was founded in 1989 in New South Wales, Australia.
280. See Independent Commission Against Corruption (visited Sept. 18,
1998) <http://www.icac.nsw.gov.au>.
281.
Anti-Corruption Agency of Malaysia Homepage, ACA's Vmiion (visited
Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.jaring.my/bpr/mission.htm>.
282.
See MOODY-STUART, supranote 99.
283.
MOODY-STUART, supra note 99; see also National Whistleblower Center

Homepage (visited Sept. 18, 1998) <http://www.whistleblowers.org/hmbdy.htm>.
284.
See Mark Pieth, Der Korruption wird der Kampf angesagt. Neue
Massnahmen gegen die Bestechung fremder Amtstrdger, NEUE ZORCHER ZEITUNG,
Feb. 28.-Mar. 1, 1998, at 15.
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and prosecution efforts.2 8 5 The rules simulate the accounting
provisions
of the
FCPA by mandating record-keeping
requirements for all business transactions and by establishing
internal control systems as a preventive measure against bribery.
However, Moody-Stuart is rather skeptical in reviewing ICC's past
history with regard to pressing its members to abide by its
recommendations, although TI used the ICC voluntary code as a
model for its Standards of Conduct. 28 6
The
Institute
for
International
Economics
follows
developments in the area of outlawing and prosecuting corruption
closely, and comments on the proposals of international
organizations. 28 7 Its own publication, Corruption and the Global
Economy, makes a contribution to a better understanding of the
stifling impact of pervasive corruption on economic and political
2 8s
development.
The World Economic Forum emphasizes the central issue of
good governance to the economic challenges for developing
countries in its press releases.
One example is the Global
CompetitivenessReport 1997, which surveys fifty-three economies,
and is based on the expertise of leading international economists
like Jeffrey D. Sachs of Harvard University, and Horst Siebert of
the Kiel Institute of World Economics. The report advocates
rigorous approaches to address corrupt practices that impact
negatively on competitiveness and economic growth. The World
Economic Forum, an independent not-for-profit foundation, is
highlighted each year for its annual Davos Conference, attended
by prominent leaders from business, government, and academia
"committed to improving the state of the world."28 9

D. OtherEfforts
Since 1985, an international journal, Corruptionand Reform,
has been published to engage in scholarly research on the social
phenomena of parallel economies and organized crime, patronclient relations, the role of money in politics, and other issues
connected with the topic of "political corruption, misconduct and

285. ICC Recommendations to Governments and International Organizations on
Extortion and Bnbery. ICC public documents.
286. See MOODY-STuART, supranote 99, at 60.
287. See generally CORRUPTION AND THE GLOBAL ECONOMY (Kimberly Ann
Elliott ed., 1996).
288. See id.
289. World Economic Forum, Global Competitiveness Report (May 21, 1997)
<http://www.weforum.org/publications/gr/backgrounder.asp>.
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policies for reform, presenting a diverse range of viewpoints and
emphasizing an international and comparative perspective." 290
Also, the drafters of the treaty language of the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) tackled the issue of the
transparency procedures for government procurement contracts.2 9 1
The AFL-CIO has gone on record in support of OECD efforts
to take effective steps against bribery in international business
transactions, and has urged unions in other nations to press their
2 92
governments to act against corruption.
Unique among the organizations going on the record for their
support of the fight against corruption is a non-trading
organization, The International Federation of Consulting
Engineers (FIDIC), which represents the consulting engineering
profession from its base in Lausanne. Its FIDIC Policy Statement
on Corrption,1996, is one of the most clearly stated position
papers on the subject of corruption: "the disease of corruption is
unfortunately spreading at the very time when world

communications are improving, as the economies of nations are
becoming more interdependent, and as we move towards the
global neighborhood. Corruption's taint includes the procurement
of design and construction."2 93 The seven recommendations to
their member associations and their members (firms and
individuals) leave no doubt as to their obligations to curb and
penalize corrupt practices.

V. CONCLUSION
Recent surges of anti-corruption activity caused by profound

changes in domestic and global attitudes towards business
corruption has placed the world on the threshold of a broad
attack on corruption through the adoption of antibribery
legislation by many nations. Current indications of changes in
domestic attitudes towards business corruption are evidenced by
the more aggressive enforcement of the FCPA and a widening of

the asserted scope of jurisdiction that the SEC has over
corporations subject to the FCPA.
Evolving global dynamics responsible for international
changes in attitudes towards business corruption include the
ending of the Cold War, technological advances which have

290. Editorial, Aims and Scope, CORRUPTION AND REFORM 7:1-18 (1992).
291. See id. at 235-36.
292. See Statement by the AFL-CIO Executive Council on Bribery in
International Transactions, Feb. 20, 1995 (visited Dec. 19, 1997)

<http://www.aflcio.org/estatements/bribe.htm>.
293.

MOODY-STUART, supranote 99, at 61, appendix 7 at 100-03.
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created a borderless capital market, the rising specter of an
integrated Europe, international mergers, and the growing
international awareness that business corruption has economic

costs.
The FCPA has played a catalytic role in influencing changes

in international attitudes. The antibribery provision of the FCPA
was the first legislation to criminalize the conduct of the corporate
bribe-giver, rather than the governmental bribe-taker. The
accounting provisions of the FCPA2 94 provided a model for a
legislative mandate for corporate accountability, as utilized by the
1997 OECD Convention, for example. 2 9 s From 1977 to the mid1990s, the FCPA has remained the sole legislative effort to
eradicate bribery in business transactions. It has, thus, provided
a functioning model for organizations and institutions now
considering antibribery legislation.
These domestic and global factors, as well as the resulting
changes in international attitudes towards business corruption,
have had a number of ramifications. One important consequence
is the formation of a network of organizations, such as
Transparency International, dedicated to tracking and eradicating
corrupt business practices. Tremendous credit must be given to
TI for its pioneer work in spotlighting the perceived corruption
levels of various nations through the widespread dissemination of
its Corruption Perception Index. TI anticipates publishing a
296
newly-conceived Bribery Index of Leading Exporting Nations.
The Index will rank and score the perceived corruption levels of
29 7
countries that are the home of the corporate bribe-payers.
Additionally,
the activities of international financial
institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund and the
World Bank, should be noted. Both of these institutions have
begun to attach guidelines to the loans they make, requiring
recipients to address and rectify bribery and other forms of
corruption.2 9 8 Leaders in the recipient nations know that in order
to receive necessary capital they will have to meet anti-corruption
standards. This provides an indirect motivation for the recipient
nations to promulgate measures that seek to reduce illicit
business transactions.
Another ramification of changing global dynamics is the
emergence of multinational agreements to combat business
corruption from organizations such as the United Nations, the

294.

See supranotes 22-28 and accompanying text.

295.
296.

See OECD Convention, supranote 47, at art. 8, 1.
See Transparency International, supranote 264.
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See id.
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World Bank Guidelines, Guidelines: Procurement under IBRD Loans

and IDA Credits, Aug. 1996, at 7.
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Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development, the
Organization of American States, and the European Union. These
organizations have been instrumental in developing prototypes of
effective legal instruments and accounting standards for nations
and multinational organizations to use in the prevention and
elimination of business corruption.
This Article predicts that in the new millenium there will be
an increased pace in the global momentum to eradicate business
corruption through the continuing implementation of various
multilateral anti-corruption agreements. As a result of these
various multilateral agreements, signatory nations and/or
member states will adopt corresponding national anti-corruption
bills to present to their respective legislative bodies. As individual
nations criminalize bribery in business transactions there will be
a reduction in the level of corruption. Only then will the world
marketplace become a level playing field which embraces the

principles of fairness and transparency and enhances confidence
in the arena in which international business and securities
transactions occur.

